Bernheim et al. [2001] examine consumption declines using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 1978-90. Data limitations force them to proxy consumption with food at home, food away from home, and rental value of home. Their Table 1 shows a consumption drop averaging 14% in the first two years after retirement -though the decline seems to build during retirement, perhaps averaging 9% in the first year and 18%, cumulatively, in the second. Table 3 implies the magnitude of the decline is negatively related to asset and pension resources. Bernheim et al. seem to favor explanations based on poor planning.
2 Using British data, Banks et al. [1998, tab.1] measure consumption declines at retirement of 22 to 35%. The authors suggest that individuals may tend to overestimate their pension entitlements (e.g., p.784).
lifestyle you now lead," and a Reader's Digest article stating that "many financial planners say it will take 70 to 80 percent of your current income to maintain your standard of living when you retire."
The first part of the present paper examines evidence from the Consumer Expenditure Survey 1983-2001 and finds that household consumption does indeed fall substantially, on average, at retirement. The second part argues that not only is the evidence consistent with variants of many widely used life-cycle models but also that measurements of the size of the post-retirement drop in consumption can reveal valuable information about the magnitude of life-cycle model parameters.
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 1 considers the possible structure of simple life-cycle saving models which incorporate labor/leisure choices. Section 2 examines U.S. data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, using it to assess the possible life-cycle shape of household consumption profiles. Section 3 sets up a life-cycle model of family behavior with nonseparable consumption and leisure, and Section 4 calibrates the parameters of the latter model. Section 5 uses the new parameter estimates to attempt to assess the impact of social security on household decisions of when to retire.
Household Preferences
In this paper's model, every household chooses its saving and labor supply to maximize its utility subject to a lifetime budget constraint. 3 The analysis assumes indivisibilities in options for market work: our households must either work full time or retire (see, for example, Hurd [1996] ). As Rust and Phelan [1997,p.786 ] write, The finding that most workers make discontinuous transitions from full time work to not working, and the finding that the majority of the relatively small number of 'gradual retirees' reduce their annual hours of work by taking on a sequence of lower wage partial retirement 'bridge jobs' rather than gradually reducing hours of work at their full-time pre-retirement 'career job' suggests the existence of explicit or implicit constraints on the individual's choice of hours of work.
The indivisibility assumption seems consistent with the fact that U.S. data show little trend in male work hours or participation rates after 1940, except for earlier retirement (e.g., Pencavel [1986] , Blundell et al. [1999] , and Burkhauser et al. [1999] ). We omit sensitivity of utility or earning power to health status -the latter being a topic for future research. Although some analyses stress the importance of features of workers' private pension plans in determining retirement behavior (e.g., Stock and Wise [1990] ), this paper takes the opposite point of view: this paper assumes that a worker picks an employer whose pension 3 The option to save (and dissave) contrasts to Stock and Wise [1990] and Rust and Phelan [1997] , where households live pre-retirement on their earnings, and post-retirement on their social security and pension benefits. Lumsdaine and Mitchell [1999] find, however, that Health and Retirement Study respondents in 1992, all of whom are near retirement, have median net worth of $500,000. Although one quarter of the amount is social security wealth, and another quarter is private pension wealth, half is from other sources. plan matches his requirements and/or that employers design their pension-plan options in accordance with worker preferences in the first place; thus, private pensions form a part of private wealth accumulation and do not require separate attention. 4 Economists adopt various simplifications about preference orderings for their models of household behavior. Since the implications of such assumptions can be very significant for the data on which this paper focuses, we begin with a comparison of specifications.
Many economic models employ utility functions which are time separable, and many find an additional assumption that concurrent leisure and consumption are separable natural as well (e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier [1986] , Anderson et al. [1999] ). Concurrent separability, however, certainly restricts a model's range of outcomes. Consider a specific example. Retirement is exogenously set (at this point). A household lives from t = 0 to t = 2, retiring at t = 1. Its time endowment at each t is 1. When it works, its leisure falls to¯ ∈ (0, 1). This paper assumes that indivisibilities force¯ to be a fixed parameter. The wage is W ; the interest rate is r. The household's consumption c t yields utility flow u(c t ); its leisure t yields utility flow v( t ); and, its assets (net worth) are a t . Think of the household's behavior as originating from
subject to: t = ¯ , for t ≤ 1 1, for t > 1 ,
Provided u(.) is concave, specification (1) predicts that consumption will change continuously with age. To see this, note along an optimal consumption path, the additional utility at date s from one extra dollar's consumption, u (c s ), must equal the additional utility from the dollar if it is saved until later date t, by which time it has grown to an amount e r·(t−s) :
Letting c t− be consumption the instant before t, and c t+ the instant after, condition (2) yields
The latter is inconsistent with a jump in consumption at any t.
Other papers assume intertemporal separability but not intra-temporal separability.
5
A well-known example is Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] . We can easily modify example (1) to illustrate. Let a household have a constant returns to scale "neoclassical" production function f : R 2 → R 1 which combines current consumption and leisure to generate a flow of services, the latter yielding a flow of utility, say, u(f ). The household solves
As before, post-retirement leisure is 1, pre-retirement leisure is¯ < 1, and we fix the retirement age to be t = 1. Since a bivariate neoclassical production function has f 12 (.) > 0, inputs are complementary in the sense that more leisure (consumption) raises the marginal product of consumption (leisure). If u(.) is linear, this would make the household want to step up its consumption at retirement: consumption would discontinuously increase after the discrete rise in leisure at retirement because the marginal product of consumption rises. If, on the other hand, u(.) is very concave, a household would strongly desire a very even flow of consumption services at different ages. Since the household produces such services more easily during retirement, it may then choose more consumption prior to t = 1. In the end, rational behavior may lead to an age profile of consumption which discontinuously changes in either direction at retirement. To be more specific, let f (.) have the familiar Cobb-Douglas form
Let u(.) have the familiar isoelastic form
5 E.g., King et al. [1988] , Hurd and Rohwedder [2003] .
If γ is nearly 1, u(.) is nearly linear. Then we would expect an upward jump in consumption at retirement. In fact,
So, indeed, whenever γ > 0, under rational planning, consumption discontinuously rises at retirement . On the other hand, we have
Thus, whenever γ < 0, the model predicts a discontinuous drop in consumption at retirement. Not only is an abrupt adjustment in consumption at retirement fully consistent with rational behavior, but also we can see that data on the size of change can potentially help us to calibrate γ -an otherwise difficult task.
Consumer Expenditure Survey
The most complete source of disaggregate consumption data for the U.S. is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CXS). The CXS has respondent households collect extensive diary information on small purchases over a multi-week time period. It conducts interviews at longer intervals asking about major purchases. The interviews also collect demographic data, data on current income, on value of house, etc. The sample is large (the BLS uses the survey in setting the CPI). The survey was conducted at multi-year intervals prior to 1984, and annually thereafter. The web site is http://stats.bls.gov.gov/csxhome.htm .
The following discussion uses, at this point, data from the site's "standard tables" for [1984] [1985] [1986] [1987] [1988] [1989] [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] . Tables 1-3 compare National Income and Product Account (NIPA) personal consumption for 1985, 1990, 1995 , and 2000 with population-weighted totals from the CXS for similar categories. The following observations seem justified. (A) For categories such as food, apparel, personal care, and recreation, the CXS captures 65-75% of the NIPA figures in 1985; the CXS captures about 110% of 1985 NIPA transportation (primarily private automobiles). (B) Other categories differ significantly between the two sources in terms of definition. NIPA "shelter" imputes service flows to owner occupied houses, whereas CXS housing does not. NIPA "medical care" is the output of the private medical sector, but CXS medical care is private household spending on the same -excluding employer contributions to private medical insurance. The CXS measures household outlays on education such as tuition; the corresponding NIPA category includes the entire output (i.e., the entire cost of operation) of the education and private foundation sectors (less government grants). NIPA "personal business" includes the output of the financial services sector, much of which households implicitly support through low interest on bank accounts, etc.; CXS "personal business" is completely different -it includes household payments for life insurance and pensions. CXS "miscellaneous" consumption incorporates household cash contributions to charity and alimony payments, whereas the same NIPA category does not. (C) CXS totals slip at an annual rate of 1.7% relative to NIPA personal consumption -perhaps the BLS is having more and more difficulty obtaining accurate responses.
Although the CXS data seems to have its share of problems, it has the virtues of comprehensiveness and of providing age-related detail; hence, this paper uses it -after adjusting it in several ways. The "adjustments" are as follows. (1) We drop mortgage payments from "shelter" but substitute NIPA housing service flows assigned to ages in proportion to relative CXS-reported housing values. (2) We drop "personal business" -for which the BLS definition differs greatly from the NIPA, and for which the BLS data includes pension contributions (which correspond to saving rather than consumption in our framework of analysis). (3) For rows in which Tables 1-2 are very similar -food, apparel, personal care, household operation, transportation, and recreation -we proportionately adjust CXS values so that category (weighted) totals coincide with NIPA figures. (4) We proportionately scale the remaining CXS categories -medical care, education, and miscellaneous -with an arithmetic average of the scaling factors from adjustment 3. Table 4 presents CXS data on consumption and income by age and this paper's adjusted consumption. Website tables present average data for (10-year wide) age groups. Table 4 interpolates consumption and after-tax income figures for each age in each year; then it computes rates of change of consumption for each year t and age s, taking, for example the age-25 consumption in 1984 away from the age-26 consumption in 1985 to derive ∆ ln(c 25, 1985 ); finally, for each age s = 25, ..., 75, it reports the mean of the 13 available ∆ ln(c st ) annual figures, t = 1984, ..., 2000, as ∆ ln(c s ). It does the same for CXS-reported household income and for this paper's adjusted household consumption. Figure 1 plots the consumption and income changes. 6 Carroll and Summers [1991] note Tables 1-2. that consumption and income grow at the same high rate for early ages in the CXS, and they suggest that liquidity constraints may play a role. Browning and others, in contrast, argue that children's births, and children's departures to form new households, lead to high, then low, consumption growth rates as parent households age. When Mariger [1986] considers these hypotheses together, he concludes that demographics may be the more important factor.
In fact, for ages less than 30, the following scenario presumably dominates the data: Mr. M, with annual income of $10,000 and consumption of $8,000, marries Miss F, who has annual income of $10,000 and consumption of $8,000, and the next year they constitute a married household MF with income $20,000 and consumption $16,000. Thus, marriage can cause average per household consumption and income to skyrocket.
To bypass changes due strictly to marriage, this paper concentrates on households of ages 30-75 or 35-75. Issues of children and liquidity constraints remain potentially important. The rest of this section seeks to measure the role of children but ignores possible liquidity constraints; the next section returns to the latter.
To incorporate children into our analysis, let the number of "equivalent adults" per household be n t . For example, if a household has two parents, let parent each constitute 1 "equivalent adult." Suppose children consume 50% as much as adults. Then a two-child family with two parents might have n t = 3 for parent ages t at which the children remain at home. Following Tobin [1967] and others, let household's utility flow at age t be Table 2 . All nominal amounts deflated with NIPA personal consumption chain index. b. Log real consumption age i + 1 at t + 1 less same age i at t for t = 1984, ..., 1996. c. Drops pension and social security contributions, drops mortgage payments, adds service flow from owner occupied dwellings. See text. d. Same formula (and deflator) as consumption.
The new version of our life-cycle maximization model allows n t = 1 and allows a household to choose its retirement age R. If the age of death is T , and if households discount the future at subjective discount rate ρ, replace (4) with
subject to: t = ¯ , for t ≤ R 1, for t > R , 
As before, let f (.) be Cobb-Douglas, and let u(.) be isoelastic. The Euler equation (e.g., (2)-(3)) yields
If
and if
the Euler equation implies
In practice, each household in our data has at least one adult, and it may have two (or, with grandparents, for instance, even more). Normalize the first adult's equivalency weight to one. Let n A t and n C t be the number of additional adults and the number of children, respectively, in a household when the first adult's age is t. Let ξ A and ξ C , respectively, be the adult equivalency of adults beyond the first and of each child. Although ξ A may be 1, it could also be substantially less than this if there are scale economies for consolidating single-adult households. We have
We use a regression equation based on (9) to summarize our adjusted CXS data. Equation (9) applies to an individual household. Since the CXS lacks a panel structure, we estimate population averages for each time and age group. Our dependent variable is the difference of the logs of the averages. For example, we compute average "adjusted" consumption for age s at time t, say,c st . Then we find average adjusted consumption for age s + 1 at t + 1 and set
This is our regression's dependent variable.
Our first independent variable is a constant. Turning to demographic information, the CXS measures average numbers of people per household and numbers of children under 18. Our "adults" per household equal "people" minus children under 18. Our second independent variable is ∆n C st , the average number of children (under 18) in age s + 1 households at time t + 1 less the average for age s households at t, etc. Our third independent variable, ∆n A st , measures changes in adults per household. Our fourth variable, ∆R st , is the average proportion of retired males of age s + 1 at t + 1 minus the average for age s at time t. 7 We add a time dummy, say, D t , for each year 1984-2000, constraining the sum of the coefficients on the dummies to equal 0. Appending an error to the right-hand side of (9) -capturing measurement error in consumption -our regression equation is
(10) Table 5 relates the regression coefficients to the parameters of our theoretical model. 
a. See equations (8)- (9).
Tables 6a-b present regression results; the next section interprets the estimates in more detail. 8 The signs of the constants imply that a household's consumption per equivalent 7 See Fullerton [1999] and the data on male retirement ages at ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ep/labor.force/clra8000.txt. 8 Since the data at this point has been constructed using interpolation, the standard errors are not trustworthy. The next revision will use data on individual ages rather than the "standard tables." 
Calibration
This section modifies our life-cycle saving model to include income taxes, social security, and a nonnegativity constraint on net worth at each age. Bankruptcy laws presumably lead to the latter constraint.
9 Existing work has noted the possible effect of binding constraints. For example, if the constraint binds consistently in youth, consumption growth at early ages will mimic income growth -biasing upward Table 6 's constant term, and presumably biasing downward our estimate of the adult equivalency of children. After presenting the new model, we use it to extract key economic parameters from Section 2's reduced-form estimates. We can then check whether the parameter values lead to binding liquidity constraints past age 30 (or 35 in the case of Table 6b ) -in which case Section 2's estimation procedures need to be revised.
The new model is
subject to: t = ¯ , for t ≤ R 1, for t > R ,
The term e t registers increases in "effective labor supply" with experience; g is the rate of labor-augmenting technological progress. As before, assume
We solve (11) using Mariger's [1986] algorithm -essentially determining (numerically) one by one the age-intervals on which the liquidity constraint a t ≥ 0 does, and does not, bind.
We fix a number of features of our model as follows. We assume each household has two adults. Time 0 corresponds to the adults each being age 22; time T corresponds to their being 76 (e.g., T = 76 − 22 = 54). We set τ = .25 and τ ss = .13. We assume a social security replacement rate of .44 if a household retires at 62 and the Social Security "normal retirement age" is 65; if the normal retirement age is 67, our replacement rate for early retirement at 62 is .39. 10 We compute average lifetime wages up to age 62, multiplied by this replacement rate. This is adjusted if benefits begin after age 62 in such a way that the present value of lifetime benefits remains the same (see the discussion in the next section). Half of social security benefits are subject to income tax. The aftertax (real) interest rate is .05.
The age profile of household earnings, the shape of which e t determines, follows Auerbach-Kotlikoff [1987] . We, however, assume that technological progress raises wages 1% per year every year. Note that because preferences are homothetic, the scaling of the earnings profile -and the scaling of the lifetime profile of equivalent adults -does not affect retirement age R or ∆ ln(c t ) or the magnitude of the discontinuous change in consumption at retirement. (Nor does the scaling of equivalent adults or earnings affect the ratio of assets to earnings generated by the model.)
A household's two adults both work the same hours: 40 hours per week until retirement; 0 hours per week after retirement. With 16 × 7 waking hours per week, we set In some examples below we omit children and normalize n t = 1 all t. (This corresponds to most of the analysis, for instance, in Auerbach and Kotlikoff [1987] .) In other cases, we assume that two children are born when a household's adults are 24 and that the children leave home to form their own families when their parents are 46. As stated above, the normalization of our equivalent adults profile is unimportant; nevertheless, the relative size of n t at different ages is significant. Table 5 shows that we can only identify the consumption weight ξ C for children after we have determined gamma and alpha. We set the key parameters ρ, α, and γ from the regression results of Tables 6a-b and the empirical retirement age. Roughly speaking, we can think of the parameter estimate β 3 , measuring the discontinuous drop in consumption upon retirement, as determining γ: as noted above, a positive gamma leads to a rise in consumption at retirement, and a negative gamma to a fall; thus, in terms of magnitudes, a gamma near 0 will tend to lead to a small discontinuity, and a gamma far from zero to a large one. Alpha determines the role of consumption relative to leisure in producing utility. If alpha is one, only consumption matters, so a household should never retire. If alpha is zero, only leisure matters, so a household should retire at age 22. Hence, we can expect information on the empirical retirement age to help us set α. Finally, a higher rho implies greater impatience, hence, less of a rise in consumption with age. We can then think of β 0 , which measures the growth rate of adult consumption with age, as determining rho. Table 7 presents our calibrations. In the actual computations, we choose a prospective value of γ, determine a corresponding α from β 3 (see Table 5 ), determine a corresponding ρ from β 0 , determine ξ C from β 1 and ξ A from β 2 . Then we solve maximization problem (11) for the desired retirement age. The sign of β 3 implies γ < 0. A grid search reveals the model's desired retirement age R rises monotonically as γ falls. The median retirement age in our data (for each year 1984-2000) is between 63 and 64; so, Table 7 presents the range of choices for γ which imply a retirement age between 63 and 64. 12 Table 7 also presents ranges for the corresponding α, ρ, ξ C , and ξ A . For none of the rows of Table 7 do household liquidity constraints bind at any age. This is broadly consistent with Mariger's [1986] findings. It seems to release us from having to reconsider the specification of Section 2's reduced-form regression equation.
Our calibrated values of γ fall within the range of the existing literature. Auerbach and Kotlikoff use a CES functional form for f (.) and their ("base case") choice for the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is .8. They warn [p.51], "There is far less direct empirical evidence concerning the value of [the elasticity of substitution]." A Cobb-Douglas function is a special case of a CES function with production elasticity of substitution equaling 1. Cooley and Prescott use the Cobb Douglas form, and their calibrated value for alpha is .36. After minor algebraic manipulation, the utility function of Stock and Wise [1990] can be seen to be the same as well. The Cobb-Douglas, but no other CES function is compatible with constant labor supply in the face of secular increases in wages and permanent changes in proportional wage-tax rates (see below); recalling Section 1, our Cobb-Douglas specification is therefore consistent with U.S. data since 1940 provided factors such as rising social security benefits prove sufficient to explain a gradually falling male retirement age.
The estimated equivalency weight of two children relative to two adults in Table 6a 14 Equation (7) shows the actual step up in consumption in going from two adults to two adults plus two children is
For Table 6a the step in levels is 1.2472; for 6b it is 1.1581.
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The estimated equivalency weight for a second adult, 13% as much as the first adult in Table 6a and 12% in Table 6b , is quite low. Such a weight implies very substantial economies of scale in household operation. There are several potentially interesting ramifications: as the elderly choose more and more to live separately from their children, and as rising divorce rates and, perhaps, later marriages, leave more young adults living alone, the economy will more and more sacrifice these scale economies; and, the U.S. Social Security System's provision of 50% incremental benefit payments for retired workers with spouses may be more generous than equality of living standards for singles and couples requires.
A great advantage of our approach is that we can jointly employ data on retirement ages and recent evidence on the drop in consumption after retirement to pin down alpha and gamma in a more direct way than previous studies have be able to do. Nevertheless, at this point, consensus estimates of the parameters from the existing literature are surprisingly well borne out, with the possible exception of child and adult equivalency scalings.
Social Security Policy Implications
This section uses our calibrated parameters to ask how much of a reduction in labor supply the present U.S. Social Security System causes. In our context, the reduction takes place entirely through decisions of when to retire. The calibrations could, of course, yield predictions of labor-supply responses to potential future changes in the Social Security System (see, for example, President's Commission [2001] ).
There are several ways to think about social security's influence on household labor supply. One which is convenient here conceptually separates the impact of social security taxes and benefits, first comparing an economy with no social security to one with taxes but no benefits, and second comparing an economy with social security taxes but no benefits to one with both taxes and benefits.
For the first step, suppose society imposes a new proportional tax on earningsbut there are no corresponding transfer payments (i.e., benefits). Let the tax rate be τ ss . Consider a household. With the new tax, the household's time endowment is worth only 1 − τ ss times as much as before. That should induce the household to consume less leisure and less goods -hence to supply more labor. Microeconomists refer to this as the "income effect" of the tax. On the other hand, since a tax falls upon work hours but not leisure, it should induce the household to supply less labor relative to leisure. This is the "substitution effect." A special property of a Cobb-Douglas home production function f (.) is that a proportional tax's income and substitution effects on labor supply exactly counterbalance one another, leaving desired labor supply unchanged. Second, add social security benefits. As society institutes benefits, a typical household is made better off, leading to an "income-effect" increase in household demand for leisure and goods, hence to a reduction in market labor supply. The "substitution effect" from benefits is more complicated. To the extent that benefits rise with retirement age, they implicitly act as a subsidy to wage earnings, inducing households to substitute work for leisure. The question is how large this inducement is. Consider an extra year of work under the present U.S. system -i.e., consider retirement at, say, age R + 1 instead of R. The U.S. Social Security System's "normal retirement age" is 65 and 8 months. Early retirement, for age 62 or later, leads to a benefit reduction for any given AIME (see below). Since this particular reduction is roughly neutral in terms of the expected present value of a household's lifetime benefits, it has no substitution-effect implications (e.g., Hurd and Smith [2002] ). At least two factors remain. (i) Upon retirement, a worker computes his AIME ("average indexed monthly earnings") from the average of his 35 highest earning years. (For future reference, note that the calculation procedure removes the effects of inflation and secular earnings growth due to technological progress.) (ii) The worker then computes his PIA ("primary insurance amount") from a formula which provides more generous benefits at lower income: in the calculations below, which are based on 1995 data, a worker's PIA equals 90% of his first $426 of AIME, 32% of his next $2141, and 15% of higher amounts. Steps (i)-(ii) both attenuate the "substitution effect" of social security benefits: in step (i), postponing retirement may provide a higher earning year for one's 35-year average, but only the increment of the new year's earnings over the earnings it replaces counts; step (ii) reduces the marginal impact of an extra dollar of earnings by 10, 68, or 85%. In our numerical examples, a worker's effective labor supply, cleansed of the effect of technological progress, rises with age into his 40s but then falls. Because of the latter fall, the step (i) correction is severe. For our representative worker, step (ii) provides a marginal benefit rate of 32%. In the end, an extra year of work at age 62 increases social security benefits only .04%.
For comparison, consider a private-sector defined benefit pension with proportionate contributions in each working year. A worker of age 62 contemplating postponing retirement for 1 more year can add a full year's contribution to his pension account. The percentage increase in the account in this case depends on all previous contributions and their appreciation, and our computations assume a 5% annual interest rate. There is no private-sector analogue to the step (ii) adjustment. In our sample computation, an extra year of work at age 62 raises the defined benefit account 3.01% -almost two orders of magnitude more than the social security case.
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In view of the tenuous linkage of social security benefits and retirement age, the remainder of our analysis simply ignores the substitution effect of social security benefits; hence, social security reduces desired labor supply because of the "income effect" of social security benefits. Table 8a computes, for each of Table 7 's parameter combinations, the increase in the desired retirement age for an economy without a social security system versus one with a normal retirement age of 65; Table 8b performs the same calculations if the system's normal retirement age is 67. Note that the U.S. Social Security System's normal retirement age was 65 in 1995; it will be 67 in 2022. Social Security seems to shift the desired age of retirement 3-4 years earlier when the normal retirement age is 65, and the same when it is 67.
There are several reasons why the simulation results should be viewed as upper limits for the effect of social security on retirement. First, as stated, the analysis omits the impact of health status. Declining health status clearly can affect retirement plans, possibly overwhelming the influence of economic incentives (e.g., Anderson et al. [1999] ). Second, business downturns may lead companies to offer buy outs for early retirement (e.g., Brown [2002] ). It is also the case that income heterogeneity complicates interpretation of our results: social security benefits tend to be a lower share of lifetime resources for workers with higher earnings; thus, the impact of social security on the retirement age of such workers will tend to be less.
We should note that the results in Tables 8a-b are positive rather than normative. While a complete analysis of possible social security reforms would require, for instance, a general equilibrium framework, this paper investigates a way of calibrating one key component of such a framework. A number of recent papers measure a decline in average household consumption following retirement. One possible explanation is that people tend to plan poorly and must subsequently retrench. Another is that households compensate themselves for working hard before they retire with relatively high consumption, and they cease this extra spending after they retire.
Conclusion
Under the second story, one can use the sign and magnitude of the change in consumption at retirement to calibrate parameters of the life-cycle saving model -in particular, the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, an important, but otherwise rather subtle, determinant of indifference-curve shapes. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, this paper illustrates how this can be done.
When Section 4 employs the calibrated parameters to study the effect of the existing U.S. social security system on retirement behavior, the simulations point to a reduction in the average retirement age of three to four years. Overlooking health status presumably leads to overstatements. Nevertheless, results point to substantial consequences for labor supply from potential future changes in social security.
